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Abstract
This study examines the effect of managerial ownership on firm value in capital markets where outside governance mechanisms to discipline 
managers are weak or non-existent. We hypothesize that strong market forces in the U.S. confound the effect of managerial ownership on 
firm value, i.e., the convergence of interest argument. We test the hypothesis using data from 112 firms from Singapore Stock Exchange and 
205 firms from the Stock Exchange of Thailand prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 when the market forces were weak, yet the investor 
protection was sufficient to prevent outright appropriation from management. For ease of comparison, we use methodologies from studies 
done on the U.S. sample firms during the same study period as ours. We find that, both in Singapore and Thailand, firm value is a function 
of managerial ownership, and the relation is of the famous inverted U-shaped. Moreover, the relation is robust under different model 
specifications. The results from Thai sample, with weaker market forces than in Singapore, lend support to many agency cost hypotheses 
advanced in the U.S. Our results provide useful implication for investors in emerging and frontier markets where outside governance 
mechanisms are yet to be fully developed.
Keywords: Agency Cost, Corporate Governance, Endogeneity, Southeast Asia
JEL Classification Code: G30, G32, G34
1. Introduction
This paper reexamines the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm value in capital markets 
where outside governance mechanisms such as market for 
corporate control, industry concentration, and shareholder 
activism are virtually non-existent. The traditional point of 
view, from Jensen and Meckling (1976), suggests that stock 
ownership is an important mechanism to align the interests 
of managers with those of shareholders. Large bodies of 
theoretical works, (Stulz, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1988), 
and empirical research, (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009), 
find that firm value is positively correlated with managerial 
ownership and the relation is of an inverted U-shape.
The empirical findings on the relation of managerial 
ownership and firm value are somewhat marred by the 
problems of endogeneity and causation (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; Villalonga, 2019). Others such as Lederer 
and Martin (1997) and Cho (1998) empirically show that 
management ownership is a function of firm value. This 
implies that managers own more shares because their 
firms have better prospects, and not vice versa. More 
recently, Fabisik, Fahlenbrach, Stulz and Taillard (2019) 
use a large sample of all cap U.S. firms from 1988 to 2015 
to show that firm value is negatively related to managerial 
ownership. Their results on large firms are, however, 
consistent with the findings from prior literature that the 
relation is increasing and concave i.e. the humped shape 
or the inverted U-shape. 
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Jensen (1993) suggests that managerial behavior 
is influenced by both inside and outside governance 
mechanisms. For example, Kim and Lu (2011) show that 
the relation between managerial ownership and firm value 
depends on the strength of external governance. Aggarwal, 
Erel, Ferreira and Matos (2011) find that international 
institution investment improves firm value (see also Vu, 
Phan and Dang, 2020 on Vietnamese sample). Faccio and 
Lasfer (1999) find no relations on the U.K. sample and 
attribute their findings to the fact that U.K. provide stronger 
outside governance mechanisms than the U.S. 
In the U.S. and U.K., the market for corporate control 
and investor protection are very well developed and active; 
consequently, there is a view that managerial behavior 
in the U.S. is much influenced by the outside governance 
mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Faccio & Lasfer, 
1999). If this view is accurate, one reason that empirical 
works on the U.S. market do not find overwhelming evidence 
to support the argument that managerial ownership affects 
firm performance is that the effect of managerial ownership 
is confounded by the effect of the outside governance 
mechanisms.
This paper attempts to examine the relation between 
managerial ownership and firm value in the absence of strong 
market forces. We hypothesize that: 1) if the relationship 
between ownership and firm value exists, we would be 
more likely to find the relation in such market environment, 
and 2) since the causality could go in either direction, the 
consistency of the relation between ownership and firm 
value obtained from different model specifications used by 
previous studies should provide us with some confidence 
regarding whether firm value is a function of ownership. 
For ease of comparison, we choose model specifications 
from studies done in the U.S. at the same time period as our 
study. The weak empirical support from U.S. studies has put 
the convergence of interest hypothesis on a questionable 
ground. By replicating different model specifications used 
in previous studies, we believe that the results from the 
alternative setting free of strong market forces can help 
provide further empirical evidence on the issue of the relation 
between ownership and firm value. We test the hypotheses 
on Singapore and Thailand before the Asian financial crisis. 
After the crisis, many Asian capital markets have engaged 
in corporate governance reform to improve the outside 
governance mechanisms such as disclosure, shareholder 
rights, and contract laws.
Thailand is suitable as an alternative setting to study 
this relationship. First, unlike that in the U.S., there is no 
active market for corporate control to discipline managers 
and boards of directors in Thailand (Johnson, Boone, Breach 
& Friedman, 2000). This condition implies that inside 
mechanisms such as ownership and monitoring from block 
holders are likely to affect managerial decision (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; 2000). 
Second, unlike such countries as Russia, Indonesia and 
Italy, Thailand and Singapore provide some level of investor 
protection (La Porta et al., 2000). This legal environment 
helps prevent managers from outright appropriation, thus 
making managers become relatively more accountable to 
shareholders than in countries where investor protection 
is weaker. Third, unlike Japan and Korea, the corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the keiretsu in Japan and 
cheobol in Korea do not exist in Thailand. The extent studies 
on these types of corporate governance suggest that firms 
with such affiliation perform differently from the so-called 
independent firms (Limphapayom & Kim, 1997; Mehadi 
& Mazumder, 2017). The absence of this type of corporate 
governance mechanism underscores the importance of 
managerial ownership in the market environment such as 
Thailand. 
Together, the absence of a market for corporate control, 
sufficient investor protection and the absence of such 
governance mechanisms as keiretsu make Thailand a unique 
setting; one that is influenced, in large part, by internal 
governance mechanisms. Singapore represents market with 
better outside monitoring system than Thailand (Johnson et 
al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2000), yet with much less active 
market for corporate control than in the U.S. and U.K. As 
such, Singapore and Thailand are very good alternatives 
to test for the relation between ownership and firm value. 
The implications about the relation between ownership and 
firm value is also significant to countries where market 
for corporate control is yet to be fully developed. Whether 
managerial stock holding enhances firm value is still a very 
important question for investors in such countries and for 
those who are considering investment in them. 
Using a cross section of 205 non-financial firms listed 
on Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1992 and 1993 
and 112 non-financial firms on the Singapore Exchange in 
1991 and 1992, we find significant evidence to support the 
convergence of interest hypothesis. We find that, consistent 
with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stulz (1988), 
managerial ownership has a significantly positive relation 
with firm value. Our results show that the positive relation 
remains significant under different model specifications, i.e., 
OLS and simultaneous equation regression (2SLS). We avoid 
making any argument on the endogeneity of the relation. We 
have a rather limited ambition that is to utilize the alternative 
settings that is free of market forces, to determine if firm 
value is a function of managerial ownership, and if so 
to determine if the relation is robust regardless of model 
specifications. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section we 
discuss the background of the empirical evidence on the 
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relations between ownership and firm value. In the third 
section, we present the research questions. Then, we present 
data and research methodology, discuss the empirical results, 
and conclude the paper.
2. Background
2.1. Single-Equation Studies
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managerial stock 
ownership affects firm value. In particular, they argue that 
increased managerial stock ownership increases shareholder 
wealth by better aligning managers’ interest with those of 
shareholders. Various empirical studies identify managerial 
stock ownership as one of the determinants of firm value 
(Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). Both 
studies find evidence to support the convergence of interest 
hypothesis at the insider ownership level below 5 percent. 
Many authors such as Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) acknowledge in their caveats that 
ownership may be determined endogenously (see also 
Limphapayom & Polwitoon, 2004; Vijayakumaran & 
Vijayakumaran, 2019).
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) suggest that, 
to remedy the endogeneity concern, focusing on ownership 
changes would be useful to understand the relation between 
firm value and ownership. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009), 
by examining changes in managerial ownership, find that 
managers increase stock holding when firm perform well 
and vice versa. Fabisik et al. (2019) expand the work of 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and find that, for all cap stocks, 
the relation is negative. By restricting to only large cap firms, 
the results in Fabisik et al. (2019) support the alignment of 
interest and managerial entrenchment, i.e. the relation is the 
inverted U-shape. Given the inconsistent empirical results 
of the relationship between insider ownership and firm 
value, the question frequently asked is whether managers 
make better decisions because they own more stock, or 
whether they own more stock because their firms have better 
performance. 
2.2. Simultaneous Equations Studies
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) are among the first who 
treat ownership as an endogenous variable. Accounting for 
the endogeneity of ownership, the authors use recursive 
regression to test the relationship between ownership and 
firm performance and find that there is no relationship 
between the two. Villalonga (2019) provides historical 
background and update of the debate on the endogeneity of 
ownership. 
Loderer and Martin (1997), L&M hereafter, cast 
the relationship between ownership and firm value in a 
structural equation framework. The authors find that, like 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), the causality runs from firm 
value to insider ownership. Cho (1998), Cho hereafter, 
confirms the existence of such a relation. These two 
studies provide empirical evidence that ownership is 
endogenous, and that ownership is a function of firm 
value. The results in L&M and Cho are of interest to our 
paper because they share the time period with our study 
thus underscoring our assumption that the effects of 
market forces might in fact cause the inconsistent results 
found on the U.S. studies. 
One important difference between results in L&M 
and Cho is the signs of the coefficients related to firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s q. In L&M, the q ratios 
have a significantly negative relationship to insider 
ownership (pp. 239), whereas in Cho, the q ratios have a 
significantly positive relationship to ownership (pp.117). 
L&M offers two interpretations for the negative 
relationship. First, managers of high q firms have more 
incentive to liquidate their stock than hold on to it. The 
managers do so for diversification reason, especially if 
their human capital is firm-specific. Second, the negative 
relationship may be attributed to the fact that managers 
in underperforming firms increase their stock holding in 
order to window-dress the situation. According to Cho, 
managers holding on to more stock when their firms have 
better prospects cause the positive relationship between 
Q and ownership. 
We summarize the results under simultaneous equation 
regressions from Cho and L&M as follow:
Variables Cho’s L&M’s
Firm Value equations (Tobin’s q proxy):
InsOwn +, insignificant –, insignificant
InsOwn2 +, insignificant  N/A
Firm size –, significant –, insignificant
Firm risk N/A +, significant
Capex +, significant N/A
Leverage –, insignificant N/A
Ownership equations (Insider ownership):
Q +, significant –, significant
Firm size –, sig., insignificant –, significant, significant
(MVE, asset) (MVE, sales)
Firm risk +, insignificant +, significant
Liquidity +, insignificant N/A
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3. Research Questions
While the extant theory and empirical evidence suggest 
that firm value is a function of ownership, the more recent 
studies employing different model specification suggest 
otherwise. The relation between firm value and ownership 
found under simultaneous equations, however, might be 
driven by sample-specific factors. L&M uses a sample of 
firms that made acquisitions during 1978-1988 whereas Cho 
looks at 326 Fortune 500 firms in 1991. The studies report 
the opposite effect of firm value on insider stock ownership. 
While L&M reports that firm value has a positive effect on 
managerial stock ownership, the Cho study reports otherwise. 
Taken at face value, the results suggest that insiders of firms 
engaging in corporate acquisitions act differently from those 
of non-acquiring firms when it comes to equity ownership. 
It might also suggest that in acquisitions paid by stocks, 
managers of the acquiring firms use over-valued stocks, 
which they do not want to own, to pay for the acquisition. 
Besides differences in sample, the two studies employ 
different specifications. The different results might as well 
due to different model specifications including a different 
choice of variables. 
The proponents of structural equation studies argue that 
the results obtained with single-equation studies are sensitive 
to model specification. L&M uses a system of two equations, 
including three predetermined variables, to investigate 
the relationship between firm value and ownership.  Cho 
argues that investment is the link between ownership and 
firm value.  He uses a system of three equations, including 
five predetermined variables, to investigate the relationship 
among ownership, investment and firm value.  
Specifically, L&M express the relationship as: 
Insider ownership = f(Firm value, sales, standard 
deviation of stock price, variance of stock price),
Firm value = g(Insider ownership, sales, dummy variable 
indicate type of payment for acquisition).
Cho express the relationship as: (All with industry 
dummy)
Insider ownership = f(Market value of equity, firm value, 
investment, volatility of earnings),
Firm value = g(Insider ownership, investment, financial 
leverage, asset size) 
Investment = h(Insider ownership, firm value, volatility 
of earning, liquidity) 
L&M acknowledge that their specification is somewhat 
arbitrary (p. 236). The specification in Cho is more carefully 
developed. Neither specification has ever been tested 
elsewhere. Both studies consistently find that ownership is a 
function of firm value. However, the signs on the coefficient 
for firm value are opposite. From model perspective, our 
question is that whether the different results are driven by 
the difference in sample and model specification. In other 
words, the issues are whether the two different specifications 
yield the same results on the same sample, and whether the 
same specification yields consistent results when employed 
on different sample. 
In this paper, we ask two questions. First, is firm value 
a function of ownership?  Second, in a “naturally controlled 
setting” where outside governance mechanisms are weak, 
do different specifications yield consistent results regarding 
the relationship between firm value and ownership? Since 
no specification can be proven right in this case, we employ 
both single-equation model and the two simultaneous 
equation frameworks introduced by L&M and Cho on a 
sample of non-financial companies listed on Singapore 
Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). 
4. Data and Methodology
For comparison purpose, we place our study squarely 
with the previous studies on U.S. Our period of study (1992-
1993) is the same period as in Cho. We employ the same 
specification as in L&M and in Cho on the Singapore and 
Thai data. 
We use a cross section of all non-financial companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 1992 and 
1993. There are 248, 279 and 322 non-financial firms in 
1991, 1992 and 1993. Companies that are included in the 
study are those that 1) appear in PACAP financial statement 
file from 1991-1993, and 2) have financial data to compute 
Tobin’s q proxy. As for the Singapore sample, there are 161 
and 174 non-financial firms with financial statement data 
available for 1991 and 1992 of which 152 and 120 firms 
have ownership data available in 1991 and 1992 respectively. 
Merging sample firms that have financial data and ownership 
data available, we are left with 112 firms that appear on 
PACAP database from 1990 to 1992. The ownership data 
for Thai firms is available for 1992 and 1993, and that for 
Singapore firms is available from 1991 and 1992. 
We obtain financial statement data from the PACAP 
database at the Sandra-Ann Morsilli Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets (PACAP) Research Center at the University of 
Rhode Island. Ownership data for Thai firms is obtained 
from CD-ROM database provided by Manager Information 
System, Ltd., (Thailand), the maker of Thailand Company 
Handbook. Singapore firms’ ownership data is collected 
from Company Handbook available at the PACAP Research 
center. Table 1 presents descriptions of variables used in this 
study.
In selecting and measuring the variables, we follow Cho 
and L&M. We measure all variables at year-end. McConnell 
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and Servaes (1990) use six as cutoff point for Tobin’s q ratio. 
We use eight as a cutoff point simply because the average q 
ratio of Thai firms is higher than U.S. firms. As a result, we 
have left with a sample of 205 firms.
Table 2 contains summary descriptive statistics of the 
sample. Table 2 Panel A describes variables for the Thai 
sample. The mean of share ownership of officers and board of 
directors of Thai firms is 18.7% in 1992 and 18.05% in 1993, 
compared with 326 Fortune 500 firms in Cho’s sample that 
report the mean of 12.14% in 1991. There are 55 Thai firms 
in 1992, and 59 in 1993 that have 0% insider ownership. 
Tobin’s q has a mean of 1.99 and 2.13 in 1992 and 1993 
respectively, compared with the U.S. firms of 1.1 and 1.3 
in 1990 and 1991. In our 1993 sample, there two firms with 
q greater than 6. There are also two firms in Cho’s sample 
with q greater than six. These two firms do not influence 
our regression results. Among the 205 sample firms, there 
are some firms with missing financial data to compute 
the variables. The variable that has the most missing data 
is volatility of earning (VARPRO). There are 194 and 195 
observations of VARPRO in 1992 and 1993. As a result, 
the Cho’s model that includes VARPRO uses 194 and 195 
observations in 1992 and 1993 analysis. 
Table 2 Panel B presents the variables used in the study 
for Singapore firms. On average, Singapore firms have 
unusually large q value with a mean of 9.6 and 8.13 and a 
median of 8.9 and 7.7 in 1991 and 1992 respectively. In order 
to preserve the sample size, we do not use any cutoff point 
for q proxy because the median value of the Singaporean 
data is well over the cutoff point of eight that we use for 
the Thai data. The mean of insider share ownership of the 
Singaporean firms is 14% and 10%, lower than that of the 
Thai firm. On the contrary, most insiders of Singaporean 
firm own some part of their company. Only seven firms in 
1991 and 12 firms in 1992 have 0% of insider ownership.
Table 3 reports the distributions of the sample statistics, 
ranked by level of insider ownership. Table 3 Panel A shows 
that about 50% of Thai firms have insider ownership less than 
10%, compared with about 68% of U.S. firms with insider 
ownership less than 10%. On the other end, about 20% of 
Thai firms have insider ownership more than 40% compared 
with 10% of U.S. firms. Table 3 Panel A also suggests that 
there is positive relationship between q proxy and ownership 
level of the Thai firms. Such positive relationship is not 
present in the Singaporean data as shown in Table 3 Panel B. 
About 60% of Singaporean firms have their insiders holding 
between some fractions of a percent to 10% of the firms 
share outstanding.
Following L&M, we estimate the following system of 
equations under two-stage least square (2SLS):  
Qi    = g12INS + b11SALES + b12IND + e1i (1)
INSi =  g21Q + b21SALES + b22STDSTK + b23VARSTK + 
b24IND +  e2i (2)
Table 1: Descriptions of Variables
Variables Descriptions
Asset size (ASSET) Natural logarithm of total assets (in thousand baht and Singapore dollar) 
Cash flow (LIQUID) Net income after dividend payments plus depreciation divided by total assets 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) Increase (decrease) in capital investment plus depreciation divided by total assets
Financial leverage (LEVER) Lag value of total liability divided by total assets
Insider ownership (INS) Percentage of insider ownership
Long-term debt (DEBT) Long-term debt divided by total assets
Market value of equity (MVE) Market value of equity (in millions of local currency)
Monthly standard deviation of stock 
returns (STDSTK)
Monthly standard deviation of firm i’s stock returns over 1987-1992 for both countries, 
1988-1993 for Thailand and 1988-1991 for Singapore
Monthly variance of stock returns 
(VARSTK)
Monthly variance of firm i’s stock returns over 1987-1992 for both countries, 1988-
1993 for Thailand and 1988-1991 for Singapore
Sales (SALES) Natural logarithm of annual sales (in thousand)
Tobin’s q proxy (Q) Market value of equity plus book value of long-term debt plus book value of short-
term debt divided by book value of assets 
Volatility of earnings (VARPRO) Standard deviation of change in profit rate in the period of 1987-1992 and 1988-1993 
for 1992 and 1993 samples respectively 
Industry (IND) Industry dummy based on PACAP-Thailand industry codes
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Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
INSa 18.70 9.10 21.47 18.05 8.92 20.83
Q 1.99 1.79 0.86 2.13 1.84 1.10
CAPEX 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.12
MVE 3,651.29 1,469.00 8,535.26 5,351.98 1,628.00 1,270.57
SALES 13.58 13.52 1.16 13.67 13.63 1.17
ASSET 14.08 13.93 1.07 14.25 14.16 1.07
LEVER 0.46 0.47 0.19 0.47 0.48 0.19
LIQUID 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
STDSTK 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.06
VARPRO 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04




Mean Median STD Mean Median STD
INS 13.79 6.45 18.24 9.79 3.31 15.61
Q 9.62 8.88 4.76 8.13 7.67 4.00
CAPEX 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.14
MVE 3372.72 1624.86 3899.54 3965.13 1596.00 5145.84
SALES 11.40 11.67 1.57 11.43 11.68 1.69
ASSET 12.33 12.32 1.17 12.52 12.46 1.27
LEVER 0.37 0.38 0.19 0.38 0.38 0.18
LIQUID 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.07
STDSTK 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.04
VARPRO 0.11 0.04 0.29 0.09 0.04 0.13
We try to preserve the model specification used in L&M 
because our purpose is to investigate how this specification 
fares under a different sample. Equations (1) and (2) are also 
similar to those used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), but the 
2SLS specification is introduced by L&M. To account for 
the non-linear relationship between stock price volatility 
and ownership, L&M expand Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
model by adding VARSTK into eq. (2). The small change 
we made is to drop from eq. (1) a dummy variable for type 
of acquisition financing used in L&M study because our 
sample does not comprise of acquisition firms. We also add 
an industry dummy variable to control for industry effect as 
in Morck et al. (1988). 
L&M estimates eq. (1) in isolation and report a negative 
coefficient of INS. The authors argue that the negative 
coefficient of INS is driven by the choice of size variable 
(p. 235). They argue that the choice of size proxy, between 
natural logarithm of sales (SALES) and that of market value 
of firm, makes a difference in the sign of INS. We use two 
different size proxies such as natural logarithm of book value 
of asset and market value of equity. We also estimate the 
firm value equation (eq.1) in isolation. Our specification 
is consistent with extant literature (Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
In the spirit of Morck et al. (1998), Cho assumes two 
changes in the slope coefficient on insider ownership. 
We select the breakpoints that best fit the data resulting 
breakpoints at 5% and 40%. We use the 5% and 40% 
breakpoints when estimating 2SLS using Cho’s specification. 
In specific, INSi is the insider ownership level for firmi. INS1i 
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will equal to INS if 0 < INS < 5%. INS2i will equal to 0 if 
INS < 5%, or INS2i will equal INS – 5 if 5% <= INS < 40%. 
Lastly, INS3i will equal to 0 if INS < 40%, or INS3i will equal 
INS – 40 if INS => 40%. 
Cho hypothesizes that ownership, investment, and firm 
value are interdependent. He contends that ownership affects 
firm value by its effect on investment, therefore, investment 
affects firm value. The author employs simultaneous 
equations of ownership, investment, and firm value using the 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. Following Cho, we 
express the model as:
INSi =  g12Qi+g13CAPEXi+ b11MVEi + b12VARPROi+ 
b13LIQUIDi +b14INDi + e1i (3) 
Qi =  g23CAPEXi + g21INS1i + g22INS2 i + g23INS3i + 
b21LEVERi + b22SALESi + b23INDi + e2i (4) 
CAPEXi =  g32Qi +g31INS1i +g22INS2i +g23INS3i 
+b31VARPROi +b32LIQUIDi +b33INDi + e1i
 (5) 
The ownership equation eq. (3) is similar to eq. (2) in 
that it expresses ownership as a function of firm value, 
size and risk plus investment and cash flow. Equation 
(4), the value equation, is similar to eq. (1), but also 
includes investment and a lagged value of leverage. This 
equation is also similar to one that is widely used under a 
single equation framework. The last equation, eq. (5), the 
investment equation, expresses investment as a function of 
ownership, firm value or investment opportunity, firm risk, 
and cash flow. This equation is developed in spirit of Hoshi, 
Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). Cho argues that cash flow affects investment (eq. (5) 
and investment affects firm value (eq. (4), thus investment 




N Q CAPEX MVE N Q CAPEX MVE
0 55 1.78 0.08 5,729.91 59 1.88 0.06 7,139.57
(0, 5) 32 1.77 0.09 2,710.75 23 1.88 0.07 3,604.67
[5, 10) 20 1.95 0.06 1,571.67 24 1.99 0.06 3,879.05
[10, 20) 23 1.69 0.17 2,812.87 27 1.85 0.09 3,732.81
[20, 30) 21 2.05 0.17 2,019.60 19 2.42 0.05 5,318.72
[30, 40) 11 2.34 0.10 7,239.04 14 3.40 0.08 1,329.98
[40, 50) 14 2.39 0.10 4,842.15 15 2.70 0.10 4,453.84
[50, 60) 16 2.56 0.14 2,049.38 12 2.28 0.07 2,083.19




N Q CAPEX MVE N Q CAPEX MVE
0 7 10.45 0.04 5,736.57 12 8.59 0.06 3,320.62
(0, 5) 41 9.17 0.04 3,386.11 40 8.04 0.04 4,318.29
[5, 10) 19 10.78 0.12 3,897.37 15 6.90 -0.05 5,799.82
[10, 20) 22 7.35 0.01 2,858.02 10 9.68 0.04 1,637.19
[20, 30) 9 9.79 0.02 2,785.83 6 6.40 -0.06 4,539.65
[30, 40) 4 13.05 0.01 1,743.40 0 na na na
[40, 50) 1 10.86 0.02 1,320.00 5 6.90 0.05 783.74
[50, 60) 5 10.34 0.12 2,312.72 1 7.79 0.34 438.48
≥ 60 4 14.92 0.02 4,228.69 2 17.24 0.01 5,227.50
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and cash flow may affect ownership (eq. (3) and they all are 
determined simultaneously in a system of equation. 
5. Empirical Results
Table 4 reports regression results from piecewise linear 
regression similar to Morck et al. (1988). We use the insider 
ownership break point of 5% and 40%. Our break points are 
different from those of Morck et al. (1988) that use 5% and 
25%. We estimate using various ownership break points and 
find that the break point of 40% fit our data the best. Due 
to data availability, we use only 2 control variables, long-
term debt and replacement cost, as oppose to four control 
variables as in Morck et al. (1988).
Table 4 Panel A presents results for Thailand. The 
preliminary results from the piecewise OLS in Panel 
Table 4: Piecewise OLS Results 
Panel A: Thailand
1992 1993




























































IND No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.16
F-statistics 7.12 2.69 3.02 3.25 8.79 2.82 5.34 2.73
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Panel B: Singapore
1991 1992




























































IND No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.24 0.12 0.31 0.01 0.001
F-statistics 1.64 4.05 5.00 4.33 5.06 3.60 1.33 1.00
p-value 0.18 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.27 0.45
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A support our argument that in an environment such as 
Thailand insider ownership might become an important 
mechanism to align interest of manager and shareholders. 
The coefficients of INS2, insider ownership between 5% 
to 40%, for the Tobin’s q equations are significant for both 
years for the Thai data. 
The results from 1993 sample also support the 
entrenchment hypothesis at high levels of ownership as 
indicated by a negatively significant coefficient of INS3. It 
should be noted that the explanatory power of our model is 
much higher than those usually found on U.S. studies, even 
our sample size is much smaller. For example, L&M report 
an R-Sq of 0.001, N=867, Cho’s piecewise regression R-sq 
of 0.014, N=326, and McConnell and Servaes (1990)’s R-sq 
of 0.06, N=1100. As for ROE equation, the 1993 sample 
provides supporting result to both interest alignment and 
entrenchment hypothesis.
The results from the Singapore sample are reported 
in Table 4 Panel B. The relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value is rather weak in the Singapore 
sample. The coefficients of ownerships are positively 
significant at ownership only at the level of 40% and above. 
We do not find any entrenchment effect in the Singapore 
sample. Surprisingly, at the lowest level of ownership, the 
ownership coefficients register an unexpectedly negative 
but insignificant sign. The weaker relation between insider 
ownership and firm value found in Singapore supports our 
earlier conjecture that in a market similar to Thailand but 
with better investor protection, the relationship should not be 
as pronounced as what we find in Thailand. 
Table 5 shows the results of 2SLS regression replicating 
L&M specifications. Table 5 Panel A reports results from 
the Thai data. Column 1 and 3 report insider ownership 
equation (eq.2) and column 2 and 4 report the firm value 
equation (eq.1). The primary result is that insider ownership 
coefficients in the firm value equation remain significant for 
both years and that endogeneity does not affect the results of 
OLS regression (recall that on U.S. sample the causation that 
runs from ownership to firm value shift under 2SLS). L&M 
reports negatively significant coefficient of Tobin’s q in the 
ownership equation, whereas ours are positively significant 
in both in 1992 in 1993.
The control variable SALES is also significant with the 
expected sign. The negative coefficients of SALES in the 
ownership equation capture the wealth constraint argument. 
For example, it is suggested that insiders hold smaller 
proportions of larger firms than small firms. L&M report 
a negatively significant coefficient of SALES in their firm 
value equation, whereas ours is positively significant. We 
argue that the positive effect of SALES on firm value should 
be expected since high sales in general should be associated 
with good performance. 
Firm risk proxy variables such as STDSTK and VARSTK 
are also significant with expected sign. The negative sign 
of coefficient estimates of STDSTK support arguments in 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and L&M that greater stock price 
volatility makes it harder to monitor manager thus creating 
a strong incentive for insiders to assemble large holding (a 
control potential). Our results on the Thai sample provide 
support to the previous works advanced in U.S., and more 
importantly they suggest that managerial ownership affects 
firm value.    
Table 5 Panel B reports results of 2SLS on the Singapore 
sample. Again, the sign of the ownership coefficients remains 
positively significant for both years. Similarly, firm value 
also has a positively significant relation with managerial 
ownership, but only for the 1991 sample. None of the 
control variables is significant. However, the explanatory 
power is much higher than that of the U.S. sample in L&M. 
The Singapore results, however, lend support to the main 
argument of this paper that is there is positive relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value are weaken in 
an environment where outside governance is stronger. 
Table 6 reports the 2SLS regression results replicating 
Cho’s specifications. We use breakpoints of insider 
ownerships at 5% and 40% in correspond to Cho’s 7% and 
38%. Table 6 Panel 1 shows the results from the Thai sample. 
The most interesting result is that, contradicting Cho’s, the 
coefficients of INS2 in the firm value model are positively 
significant for both years. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
INS3 in the firm value equation is negatively significant in 
1993. 
Consistent with the famous hump-shaped reported in 
Morck et al. (1988), the results in Panel A suggest that insider 
ownership has a positive relation with firm value, and that 
the relationship is concave at the higher level of ownership 
as shown by the negative effect of INS3. The negative effect 
of INS3 supports the entrenchment hypothesis. Note that 
the results from the 2SLS are consistent with those from the 
OLS in Table 4. This gives us more confidence to argue that 
firm value is a function of insider ownership regardless of 
model specifications in a country where market forces are 
weak.
Consistent with Cho, the coefficients of Tobin’s q proxy 
in the insider ownership equation are positively significant 
for both years. Other control variables such as size proxies 
and the firm risk proxy also show the expected signs. For 
example, the coefficient of MVE is significantly negative 
in the ownership equation for both years. The coefficients 
of asset size in firm value equation are also positively 
significant, consistent with the results of SALES in Table 
5. In the capital expenditure equation, the coefficient of 
LIQUID is positively significant for both years. The results 
are also consistent with extent literature. 
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Table 5: 2SLS Regression Results for L&M Model
Panel A: Thailand
1992 1993




















IND Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.41 0.79 0.45 0.76
F-statistics 8.67 46.80 10.48 40.54
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Panel B: Singapore
1991 1992














STDSTK -34.92(-0.27)  
26.64
(0.21)
VARSTK 179.11(0.35)  
78.56
(0.15)
IND Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.35 0.55 0.29 0.53
F-statistics 7.34 20 4.92 14.97
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Table 6: Two-Stage Least Square Regression Results for Cho Model
Panel A: Thailand
1992 1993
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1992 1993













































IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.41 0.85           0.38 0.27 0.75 0.44
F-statistics 7.90 53.69           6.92 4.80 30.34 8.72
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Panel B: Singapore
1991 1992



























































IND Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjust R-Sq. 0.49 0.57 0.16 0.03 0.84 0.08
F-statistics 11.16 13.69 2.86 1.3 39.78 1.66
p-value <.0001 <.0001 0.00 0.25 <.0001 0.10
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Another interesting result is the sign of the lagged value 
of leverage ratio in the firm value equation. Cho reports a 
negatively insignificant coefficient. Ours are positive for 
both years; the coefficient in 1993 has a t-statistics of 2.66. 
This finding supports the agency benefits of debt advanced 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and it also supports the free 
cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). 
Table 6 Panel B reports results from the Singapore sample. 
The only support we find from the Singapore sample is the 
positively significance of the coefficient of INS3 in 1992. 
It shows that in the Singapore sample, the relation between 
ownership and firm value is significant only at the ownership 
level of 40% or more. Note that the results from 2SLS are 
consistent with that from OLS in Table 4. The rather weak 
result regarding the relation between insider ownership and 
firm value in Singapore in fact supports our conjecture that 
better investor protection confounds the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm value, hence, the Singapore results are not 
as evidence as those from Thailand.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we ask two questions. First, is firm value 
a function of managerial ownership?  Second, does strong 
market forces confound the mix results of the relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value found in 
U.S. studies? We test the hypotheses on the samples from 
Singapore Stock Exchange and Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
The sample period is prior to corporate governance reform 
undertaken after the Asian financial crisis. During the 
sample period, the two capital markets provide alternative 
settings that are, in large part, free of market forces. For ease 
of comparison, we use various model specifications done on 
U.S. samples during the same period as our study.
In all, our results provide empirical support to various 
agency cost hypotheses advanced in U.S. The Singapore 
results are consistent with the argument that concentration 
of managerial shareholding benefits firm value. Moreover, 
the famous inverted U-shape that depicts the relation 
between managerial ownership and firm value is more 
pronounced in all specifications in the Thai sample, where 
market forces are weak, even if our sample is much smaller 
than those in the U.S. studies. The results are robust under 
many different model specifications. Our results provide 
useful implications for investors in emerging and frontier 
markets where outside governance mechanisms are yet to 
be fully developed.
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